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The sync server is the key to your cloud: what Storm-0501 did with Entra Connect

Microsoft documented a ransomware group that moved from on-premises AD to Entra ID and Azure through a sync server. What happened, and how to treat the bridge between them.

By Jim Venuto

From one server in the office to owning the Azure subscription

On August 27, 2025, Microsoft Threat Intelligence described an intrusion by a group it tracks as Storm-0501. The victim ran a common setup: on-premises Active Directory domains synchronized to Microsoft Entra ID with Entra Connect Sync, and production data in Azure.

The attackers compromised the Entra Connect Sync server, which Microsoft notes was not onboarded to Defender for Endpoint. With the server’s Directory Synchronization Account they listed users, roles and Azure resources in the tenant. Their first attempts to sign in as privileged users were stopped by Conditional Access and MFA.

Then they found what they needed: a non-human synchronized account that held the Global Administrator role and had no MFA method registered. They reset its password on-premises, the change was synchronized to the cloud through password hash synchronization, and they registered their own MFA method. To satisfy a Conditional Access rule that required a hybrid-joined device, they moved to a hybrid-joined server and signed in from there.

From there, Microsoft describes the cloud phase in detail. The attackers used an Azure operation that lets a Global Administrator grant themselves access to all subscriptions, took ownership, copied data out with AzCopy, and then deleted snapshots, restore points, storage accounts and Recovery Services containers. They also deleted resource locks and immutability policies, and where immutability still held, they encrypted data with a Key Vault key under their control.

No traditional malware was deployed in the cloud. Every step used legitimate administrative features.

Why this matters to a small organization

Most SMBs, school districts and towns with Microsoft 365 got there through hybrid identity. Entra Connect is often installed once, on whatever server was available, and then left alone because it just works. It is easy to think of it as a utility.

Microsoft’s own documentation says otherwise. The Entra Connect server “must be treated as a Tier 0 component,” the same class as domain controllers, and Microsoft recommends hardening it as a control plane asset. The reason is in one sentence on the same page: if an attacker gets control over the Entra Connect server, “they can manipulate users in Microsoft Entra ID.”

Storm-0501 also needed one more mistake: a privileged account synchronized from on-premises, without MFA. That account turned an on-premises compromise into a cloud compromise.

Pointers for the bridge between on-premises and cloud

These are the moves that close the specific path Microsoft described. They are a starting point, not the complete hardening of a tenant.

  1. Treat the sync server like a domain controller. Only administrators of the domain tier sign in to it. It has endpoint detection and response. It is patched promptly. Microsoft’s Storm-0501 guidance also recommends enabling the Trusted Platform Module on the server to protect the credentials it stores.
  2. Keep cloud administrators in the cloud. Microsoft recommends separate, cloud-only Global Administrator accounts with no ties to on-premises Active Directory. If an admin account is synchronized from on-premises, an on-premises password reset can take it over.
  3. Require MFA for every privileged account, including service and “non-human” accounts. If an account cannot use MFA, it should not hold a privileged role.
  4. Limit where the sync account can sign in from. Microsoft suggests Conditional Access to restrict Directory Synchronization Account sign-ins from untrusted IP addresses.
  5. Turn off soft matching and hard match takeover when you are not using them. Microsoft’s prerequisites page tells customers to disable both. They let an on-premises object take control of an existing cloud account, which is useful during migration and dangerous afterward.
  6. Make sure backups survive an administrator. The attackers targeted snapshots, restore points and immutability policies first. Immutability that an administrator cannot lift, soft delete, and backups held outside the tenant are what limit that damage.

Who does what

Leadership decides who may hold Global Administrator and approves the rule that privileged cloud accounts are cloud-only. Your IT team or MSP hardens the sync server, configures Conditional Access, disables soft and hard matching, and tests that backups cannot be deleted by a single compromised account. Whoever owns each service account documents why it exists and confirms it has no standing admin role it does not need.

Where outside help fits

The Storm-0501 path ran across three teams’ boundaries: the server team, the identity team and whoever owns Azure. In a small organization those might be one MSP, two vendors and nobody. CyberIntelPro leads the identity and recovery architecture: which accounts and servers form the bridge, how backups should be separated, and the change list for your MSP or IT staff. Hudson Valley CISO governs the decisions that keep it that way, such as who approves a new privileged account and how often role assignments are reviewed.

Want to talk it through? Book a free 30-minute call with Security Medic Consulting.

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