Google Cloud's quiet default: service accounts with the Editor role
Older Google Cloud projects often give default service accounts the broad Editor role. Why that matters, what Google changed for new organizations in 2024, and what to check.
A flaw that came from a default
In July 2024, Tenable described a vulnerability in Google Cloud it called ConfusedFunction. When a customer deployed a Cloud Function, Google Cloud attached a default Cloud Build service account behind the scenes, and Tenable found that this account had excessive permissions an attacker could exploit to escalate privileges. The issue affected both first- and second-generation Cloud Functions.
Google applied a partial fix for Cloud Build accounts created after mid-June 2024. According to the reporting at the time, existing Cloud Build accounts were not changed, and Tenable recommended replacing legacy Cloud Build service accounts with least-privilege ones.
The specific bug matters less than the pattern. A permission granted by default, years ago, to an account nobody chose, became the path.
The default most older projects still carry
Google’s documentation says it plainly: when certain services are enabled, the default service account “might automatically be granted the Editor role on your project.” The two Google names are the Compute Engine and App Engine default service accounts. Google adds: “We strongly recommend that you disable the automatic role grant.”
Editor is one of Google Cloud’s broadest roles. A virtual machine, a function or a small app running as a default service account with Editor can change most resources in the project. If that workload is compromised, so is the project.
In March 2024, Google announced stronger default organization policies for new customers. Its documentation now says these security baseline constraints “are enforced for all organizations created on or after May 3, 2024.” They include:
- Preventing default service accounts from receiving the Editor role at creation
- Preventing the creation and upload of long-lived service account keys
- Restricting which domains can be granted access to your resources
- Requiring uniform bucket-level access in Cloud Storage
Google was explicit about the limit: “Existing organization resources are not impacted by this change.” An organization created before May 2024, which is most organizations that have used Google Cloud for a while, keeps whatever settings it had.
Why small organizations miss this
Many SMBs and schools came to Google Cloud through Google Workspace, a single project for one application, or a vendor who set it up. The project works, so nobody looks at the identities it runs under. Downloaded service account keys sit on laptops and in old repositories. Nobody remembers which default accounts have Editor.
Pointers for a Google Cloud review
These are the first checks, not a full hardening of the organization.
- Check when your organization was created and which baseline constraints are enforced. Google documents a command to list the organization policies in effect. If the baseline constraints are missing, decide which to enforce.
- Find default service accounts that hold Editor. For each one, Google recommends replacing Editor with less permissive roles. Test first, because some workloads rely on it.
- Give each workload its own service account. Tenable recommended replacing legacy accounts with a least-privilege service account for each function, and the same approach applies to every application.
- Retire downloaded service account keys. Google recommends allowing service account keys only where none of the more secure alternatives will work. Inventory the keys that exist, then remove them one integration at a time.
- Make exceptions narrow. If a project genuinely needs a constraint relaxed, Google recommends granting the exception to the relevant project only, not the whole organization.
Who does what
Leadership decides who owns the Google Cloud organization and approves the baseline policies. Your cloud administrator or MSP reviews service accounts, roles and keys, applies the constraints and tests changes. Developers and vendors move their applications to dedicated service accounts and tell you where any keys remain.
Where outside help fits
Default settings are exactly the kind of risk that passes every quick check because nothing looks broken. Security Medic’s Cloud Security Assessment covers Google Cloud alongside AWS and Azure, so the same questions get asked of each. CyberIntelPro leads the identity architecture: which workloads run as which accounts, which constraints to enforce, and the change list for your team. Hudson Valley CISO governs the exceptions over time.
Want to talk it through? Book a free 30-minute call with Security Medic Consulting.
Sources
- Cybersecurity News, ConfusedFunction Vulnerability in Google Cloud Platform Let Attackers Escalate Privileges, July 26, 2024 (accessed 2026-11-06).
- Google Cloud Blog, Introducing stronger default Org Policies for our customers, March 20, 2024 (accessed 2026-11-06).
- Google Cloud documentation, Manage Google Cloud security baseline constraints, updated October 26, 2026 (accessed 2026-11-06).
- Google Cloud documentation, Service account types, updated November 4, 2026 (accessed 2026-11-06).